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The Risks and Rewards of Renegotiating the 
North American Trade Relationship 
DAVID A. GANTZ† 
 
We now live in a North American economy built around the 
reality of free trade. In particular, U.S., Canadian and Mexican 
manufacturing are deeply enmeshed with one another. Many industrial 
plants were built precisely to take advantage of our economic 
integration, buying from or selling to other industrial plants across the 
borders. As a result, breaking up or degrading NAFTA would have the 
same disruptive effects that came from NAFTA’s creation: Plants 
would close, jobs would disappear, and communities would lose their 
livelihoods. And, yes, many businesses, small, large and in some cases 
huge, would lose many billions of dollars.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”),2 despite 
much criticism, had led to significant advantages for all Parties: total 
goods and services trade approaches $1.3 trillion annually. NAFTA 
 
© 2018 David A. Gantz.  
† Samuel M. Fegtly Professor, Rogers College of Law, the University of Arizona.  
 1.  Paul Krugman, Opinion, Trump, Trade and Tantrums, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/opinion/trump-trade-and-tantrums.html; See also 
Steven Mufson, Joshua Partlow, & Alan Freeman, Trump Twitter Bombs and a Negotiating 
Standoff: How NAFTA Talks Could Fail, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-twitter-bombs-and-a-
negotiating-standoff-how-nafta-talks-could-fail/2017/10/06/96b25f68-a91b-11e7-850e-
2bdd1236be5d_story.html (quoting C. Fred Bergsten, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute, 
“[F]ailure is an option . . . It depends on whether the Trump people follow through on their 
rhetoric.”). 
 2.  North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 19 U.S.C. 
21, 32 I.LM. 289 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994). A free trade agreement under GATT 
art. XXIV is a regional agreement in which the Parties agree inter alia to eliminate tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers within the region for all goods that originate within the region. 
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has produced one of the most efficient automotive production sectors 
in the world; stimulated U.S. exports of agricultural products, with 
Canada ($21.8 billion) and Mexico ($18.3 billion) representing the 
United States’ first and third most important export destinations; and 
permitted the creation of supply chains that allow North America to 
compete with European and Asian manufacturers that have ready 
access to lower labor cost for labor intensive manufacturing 
operations.3   
But as discussed in Part II, below, NAFTA has become a 
scapegoat for other problems with U.S. manufacturing employment, 
aided by the Trump Administration’s myopic focus on the U.S. trade 
deficit with Mexico ($60 billion on total trade of $531 billion) and 
unhappiness with Mexico as a locus for lower labor cost manufacturing 
by U.S. enterprises. Most of the largest U.S. trade deficits are with 
nations where the United States has no FTA (China, Germany and 
Japan)4 so blaming deficits on regional trade agreements seems 
illogical. In any event, most economists agree that trade deficits are the 
result of fiscal policies, including actions such as tax reductions 
without corresponding reductions in government spending that 
encourage deficit financing, as well as low savings rates and high 
consumption, rather than trade agreements per se.5  
Neither reducing the trade deficit nor discouraging U.S. 
manufacturing investment in Mexico (except peripherally with 
enforceable environmental and labor standards and possibly the 
elimination of investor-state dispute settlement), nor forcing Mexico 
to pay for a border wall is achievable through the demanded 
renegotiation of NAFTA. The first two are the antithesis of free trade 
agreements, and the latter if agreed to by Mexico would likely topple 
any Mexican government. Still, an agreement signed twenty-five years 
ago could benefit from updating in such areas, inter alia, as 
 
 3.  See generally Francisco Veloso & Rajiv Kumar, The Automotive Supply Chain: 
Global Trends and Asian Perspectives, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (Jan. 2002), 
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28439/wp003.pdf. (Japanese and Korean 
auto manufacturers have relationships with suppliers in China and to a lesser extent Vietnam 
and Indonesia. [The EU members have lower wage cost jurisdictions in Eastern Europe.]). 
 4.  Kimberly Amadeo, U.S. Trade Deficit by Country: Current Statistics and Issues, THE 
BALANCE (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/trade-deficit-by-county-3306264 
(showing the largest five trade deficits to be with China, Japan, Germany and Mexico, in that 
order). 
 5.  See generally Eduardo Porter, Why the Trade Deficit Matters and What Trump Can 
do About It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/business/economy/trade-deficits-nafta.html 
(discussing the challenges in reducing the trade deficit and the counterproductive effects of 
withdrawing from trade agreements). 
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establishing rules on ecommerce and prohibiting barriers to the free 
flow of data, investor-state dispute settlement (with enhanced host 
country regulatory flexibility); more effective enforcement of labor 
rights and environmental protection; rigorous competition law 
disciplines; support for SMEs; and improved government 
procurement. 
It is this dichotomy that is the focus of the present article. Will the 
Trump Administration be prepared to agree with Canada and Mexico 
on a modernized NAFTA that preserves its trade and investment 
liberalization features (perhaps incorporating a few of the less radical 
new U.S. proposals) and establishes new protections for data, or will it 
insist (unsuccessfully) on an agreement that is highly protectionist in 
terms of trade and investment within North America and rolls back 
most of the major benefits afforded earlier to the other Parties and their 
stakeholders? As of mid-March 2018, U.S. officials have made a series 
of controversial proposals6 that have been rejected by Canada and/or 
Mexico, most recently in the seventh round of negotiations in Mexico 
City that ended March 5, 2018, without agreement on major issues.7 In 
my view, if the United States maintains its obsession with the trade 
deficit and its unwillingness to compromise on major demands it is 
likely that the negotiations will fail through termination of NAFTA by 
the United States, or drag on indefinitely. Such termination would 
result in serious negative consequences for each of the North American 
economies and a significant loss of North American manufacturing 
competitiveness worldwide, although a substantial volume of intra-
North America trade would undoubtedly continue. It will also 
squander a significant opportunity (after the United States’ withdrawal 
from a pact—the Trans-Pacific Partnership—that established such 
protection for data) to prohibit barriers to data flows that threaten some 
$400 billion of annual U.S. data exports worldwide, particularly by 
such companies as IBM, Citibank, Federal Express and Visa.8 
 
 6.  See Josh Wingrove & Eric Martin, NAFTA Talks Left Reeling After Aggressive U.S. 
Proposals Land, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2017, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-16/nafta-talks-left-reeling-after-
aggressive-u-s-proposals-land (listing changes in auto rules of origin, a sunset clause, 
restricted government procurement and effective emasculation of the three NAFTA dispute 
settlement mechanisms). 
 7.  See Rossella Brevetti, NAFTA Talks Move on Modernization Issues, Not U.S. 
Demands, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Mar. 12, 2018), (summarizing the state of the 
negotiations). 
 8.  David J. Lynch, The U.S. Dominates the World of Big Data. But Trump’s NAFTA 
Demands Could Put That at Risk, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trumps-trade-deficit-obsession-could-
hurt-leading-american-industries/2017/11/27/b2b8122c-cbb5-11e7-8321-
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Part II of this article briefly reviews the NAFTA experience over 
the past twenty-four years, with emphasis on trade creation and the 
competitiveness of the United States with principal rivals, the 
European Union nations and China, both of which have broad access 
to low cost labor and have become effective in the supply management 
that makes production more efficient in a global economy. Part III 
discusses the structure, and challenges of the renegotiations as of 
spring 2018. Part IV reviews the alternatives to NAFTA for Canada 
and Mexico if and when the United States is successful in terminating 
NAFTA. It also gives particular attention to the North American auto 
industry and agricultural trade in a post-NAFTA North America. Part 
V addresses (briefly) the legal complexities of a U.S. withdrawal from 
NAFTA. Part VI provides a short overview of the available—and 
largely unattractive—alternatives to the renegotiation. 
Because the negotiations remain underway and are likely to 
continue at least through April 2018,9 this article reflects a significant 
level of uncertainty and speculation. Tensions among the President and 
his advisors, and between the Administration and Congress, and with 
diverse stakeholders, have not been resolved. Despite assertions by top 
U.S. officials that a radically redesigned NAFTA could win the support 
of both U.S. labor and industrial stakeholders, few observers believe 
this is the case.10 U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer bitterly 
criticized Canada and Mexico in October for declining to respond to 
U.S. calls to reduce the U.S. trade deficit through a NAFTA 
renegotiation,11 and renewed the criticism after each session.  Thus, in 
March 2018, the U.S. position had not changed; Ambassador 
Lighthizer continued to advocate both modernization (which is 
achievable) and a “rebalancing of NAFTA” to encourage “fair” 
treatment for the U.S. manufacturing sector and workers (which as 
 
481fd63f174d_story.html?utm_term=.3fd4dc74eca3. 
 9.  See Ana Swanson, Signs of Progress in NAFTA Talks but Countries Remain Deeply 
Divided, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/29/us/politics/nafta-
talks-conclude-in-montreal-with-signs-of-progress-and-risk.html (noting that despite lack of 
much progress negotiations were scheduled  for Mexico City in late February and Washington, 
D.C. in April 2018). 
 10.  See Lighthizer:’Historic’ NAFTA 2.0 Could Win Labor and Business Support, Lead 
to ‘Paradigm Change’ in Congress, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/lighthizer-%E2%80%98historic%E2%80%99-nafta-20-
could-win-labor-and-business-support-lead-%E2%80%98paradigm-change (quoting both 
Lighthizer and various skeptical congressional sources). 
 11.  Andrew Mayeda, Mexico, Canada Refused to Improve NAFTA Text, USTR Says, 34  
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defined by Ambassador Lighthizer is not likely to be attained).12 
Unfortunately, for Mexico and Canada, the “rebalancing” that the 
United States seeks may be worse than having no NAFTA at all.  
Given the level of disagreement among the three Parties as to the 
content of a revised NAFTA, it seems clear that if the negotiations are 
successfully completed at all, it probably will not be until after a new 
Mexican president is elected (July 1) and takes office (December 1, 
2018), and the U.S. convenes a new Congress in January 2019 
(assuming the President does not attempt to terminate NAFTA before 
then). 
II. NAFTA OVERVIEW 
NAFTA, despite much criticism, has led to significant advantages 
for all Parties 
Total goods and services trade approaches $1.3 trillion annually.13 
It has been a major factor responsible for the creation and maintenance 
of an efficient, globally competitive automotive industry.14 Here, as in 
other industrial sectors, North American supply chains allow the 
United States to compete with European and Asian manufacturers that 
have access to lower labor cost production for labor intensive 
manufacturing and assembly operations. Extensive exports in 
agricultural products, with Canada ($23 billion) and Mexico ($18 
billion) representing the United States’ first and third most important 
export destinations, is largely a result of NAFTA’s reducing barriers 
for U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico and Canada.15 While estimates 
vary, it is clear that many millions of Canadian and Mexican as well as 
U.S. jobs are dependent on North American trade, including those 
 
 12.  See Statement of USTR Robert Lighthizer at the Closing of the Seventh Round of 
NAFTA Renegotiations, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/february/statement-
ustr-robert-lighthizer. 
 13.  The Facts on NAFTA: Assessing Two Decades of Gains in Trade, Growth, and Jobs, 
U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. (Mar. 8, 2017, 11:15 AM), https://www.uschamber.com/report/the-
facts-nafta-assessing-two-decades-gains-trade-growth-and-jobs [hereinafter Chamber: 
NAFTA Facts]. 
 14.  Melina Kolb & Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, A Guide to Renegotiating NAFTA, 
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (June 19, 2017; 6:00 AM), https://piie.com/blogs/trade-
investment-policy-watch/guide-renegotiating-nafta.  
 15.  See U.S.-Mexico Trade Facts, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/mexico; see also U.S.-Canada Trade Facts, 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/countries-
regions/americas/canada.  
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attributable not only to manufacturing but to services and 
transportation as well.   
The Administration’s focus on manufacturing jobs and the trade 
deficit with Mexico fails to consider the fact that as much as 88 percent 
of all U.S. job losses since 2000 are due to technology and automation 
rather than to offshoring to Mexico or China,16 and that such losses are 
likely to increase in coming years regardless of whether NAFTA 
remains in force. In fact, it is reasonable to speculate that if more 
manufacturing were forced back into the United States from Mexico 
due to Trump Administration policies the affected manufacturers 
would do everything feasible to minimize the hiring of relatively costly 
U.S. workers, either through more extensive use of robots or seeking 
lower cost production in Asia or Eastern Europe.  
It is also telling that both major political parties have failed over 
the past three decades to help the losers from globalization in terms of 
retraining and adjustment assistance, to deal through labor or tax laws 
with growing wage disparities between blue collar workers and 
professionals, or to take other steps that would help displaced 
manufacturing workers remain part of the middle class. Manufacturing 
job losses resulting from NAFTA have been widely estimated; for 
example the Economic Policy Institute estimates that 700,000 jobs 
were lost through U.S. production moved to Mexico (1994-2013). This 
sounds like a large number, unless one recalls that in good times the 
United States creates about 250,000 net new manufacturing jobs every 
month (313,000 in February 2018 alone)!17 
Nor are other causes of slow U.S. economic growth and poor 
income distribution to be ignored. Outmoded U.S. tax laws with high 
corporate tax rates (until modified in late 2017)  have encouraged U.S. 
enterprises to do business in lower tax jurisdictions; whether the 
reduction of the marginal corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 
percent, and other changes favorable to enterprises, will significantly 
affect U.S. manufacturing jobs remains to be seen.18 It also remains 
questionable whether tax reductions that increase the deficit by an 
estimated $1.5 trillion, and discourage both government and private 
savings and stimulate more borrowing, will have any result other than 
 
 16.  Barb Darrow, The Bright Side of Job-Killing Automation, FORTUNE (Apr. 5, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/04/05/jobs-automation-artificial-intelligence-robotics/. 
 17.  Ian Kullgren, Job Growth Surged in February in Wage Growth Slackened, POLITICO 
(Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/09/monthly-jobs-numbers-february-
2018-448785.  
 18.  New Tax Law (H.R. 1) – Initial Observations, KPMG (Dec. 22, 2017), 
https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/us/pdf/2017/12/tnf-new-tax-law-dec22-2017.pdf. 
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driving up the dollar and costs of U.S. exports, thus further increasing 
the trade deficit.19 Research and Development (“R&D”) spending by 
government (but not by private enterprise) has slowed in recent years 
to a record low, with overall R&D spending amounting to 2.78 percent, 
of GDP, down from 2.81 percent in 2009 and well below the 3.0 
percent target proposed by President Obama in 2009.20 U.S. 
transportation (road, railroad and port) infrastructure spending as a 
percentage of U.S. GDP has deteriorated steadily since 1965, from 
over 0.5 percent to about 0.032 percent,21 with little hope of rapid 
reversal given that infrastructure improvement has not been pursued to 
date by the Trump Administration.22 
If the abandonment of the Transpacific Partnership agreement 
(“TPP”) by the United States23 and broader U.S. economic 
disengagement from Asia is joined by U.S. termination of NAFTA, it 
seems inevitable that U.S. manufacturing jobs will be further reduced 
rather than augmented because of exports lost to nations with 
preferential trading arrangements, even assuming the U.S. trade 
policies do not trigger a trade war with our major trading partners such 
as the EU and China. The focus on manufacturing and the goods trade 
deficit jeopardizes not only agreement on data services as noted earlier, 
but the $88 billion in U.S. services exports to Canada and Mexico.24 
 
 19.  See Paul Krugman, Opinion, Everybody Hates the Trump Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/opinion/trump-tax-plan-
hate.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fopinion&action=click&contentCollectio
n=opinion&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=6&pgty
pe=sectionfront&_r=0 (noting that the borrowed funds would come from abroad, driving up 
the value of the dollar, increasing the trade deficit by an estimated $6 trillion over ten years). 
 20.  See Mike Henry, US R&D Spending at All-Time High, Federal Share Reaches 
Record Low, AMERICAN INST. OF PHYSICS (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.aip.org/fyi/2016/us-rd-
spending-all-time-high-federal-share-reaches-record-low (citing current trends as reported by 
the National Science Foundation). 
 21.  Jeff Davis, The 70-Year Trend in Federal Infrastructure Spending, ENO 
TRANSPORTATION WEEKLY (May 12, 2016), https://www.enotrans.org/article/70-year-trend-
federal-infrastructure-spending/. 
 22.  See Lauren Gardner, Trump Talks Infrastructure, But $1 Trillion Plan is as Elusive 
as Ever, POLITICO (Aug. 15, 2017, 5:59 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/15/trump-transportation-roads-infrastructure-241666 
(discussing Trump’s “languishing proposal for a $1 trillion initiative to rebuild the nations, 
roads, tunnels and bridges). 
 23.  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, signed Feb. 4, 2016 (not in force), available 
at http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/official-documents/Pages/official-
documents.aspx. [Hereinafter, TPP] (the United States, an original signatory, formally 
withdrew on January 23, 2017); see Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the 
United States from Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement (Jan. 23, 2017), 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/23/presidential-
memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific.  
 24.  Services Industry Group: NAFTA Withdrawal Could Lead to Loss of 587,000 U.S. 
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Similarly, new restrictions on the government procurement market 
(which governs goods and services sales to foreign government 
agencies), could end the current situation where an estimated four out 
of five of all Mexican government employees are insured by a U.S. 
services supplier, with other U.S. firms providing the Mexican 
Government with pensions and auto insurance.25 Whether major 
stakeholders, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which have 
joined the process very late in the game,26 and strong (if belated) 
support from pro-NAFTA Senators27 can have significant influence on 
the U.S. Administration’s negotiating stance remains to be seen. 
III. NAFTA RENEGOTIATION 
To reiterate, general objectives earlier suggested by the 
Administration cannot be achieved through NAFTA renegotiation. 
These include discouraging U.S. businesses from moving labor-
intensive manufacturing production to Mexico; reducing the trade 
deficit with Mexico (other than by drastically reducing trade); and 
forcing Mexico to pay for the cost of the Border Wall directly or 
indirectly.28 
It is also doubtful whether the U.S. negotiating proposals made in 
October and renewed without significant change in subsequent 
negotiating sessions, largely rejected by Canada and Mexico, would 
significantly increase U.S. manufacturing employment, due in 
significant part to disrupted supply chains and higher cost parts and 
components. This non-exhaustive list of U.S. demands includes: 
● United States rather than North American content rules for 
 
Jobs, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Nov. 17, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/trade/services-industry-
group-nafta-withdrawal-could-lead-loss-587000-us-jobs.  
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See John G. Murphy, Which States Would be hit Hardest by Withdrawing from 
NAFTA, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.uschamber.com/above-the-
fold/which-states-would-be-hit-hardest-withdrawing-nafta#TrumpStates (listing the ten 
states, all Trump supporters, which would suffer the greatest export and job losses). 
 27.  See Letter to President Trump, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Jan. 30, 2018), available at 
https://insidetrade.com/sites/insidetrade.com/files/documents/2018/jan/wto2018_0045.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2018) (from more than 30 Senators reaffirming the benefits of NAFTA). 
 28.  USTR’s latest guidance affirms the primacy of lowering the trade deficit and 
emphasizes rules of origin that would require a significant part of auto manufacturing content 
to be of U.S. origin (explained in more detail below). In this document at least, there is no 
mention of Mexico paying for the wall. See Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA 
Renegotiation, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Nov. 2017), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/Nov%20Objectives%20Update.pdf 
(“Objectives II”).  
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manufacturing of automobiles and perhaps other products, with 82.5 
North American content (up from 62.5 percent), including 50 percent 
U.S. content (including steel and aluminum);29 
● Limitation of the U.S. government procurement market to the 
same dollar value as U.S. procurement in the other two Parties, an 
impractical restriction given that the U.S. economy is 18-20 times the 
size of the Mexican and of the Canadian economy; 
● A partial roll-back of US textile and clothing market access 
through greater restrictions on the use of non-North American fabrics 
and yarns; 
● Increases in so-called “unfair” trade remedy protection for U.S. 
growers against imports of labor intensive winter fruits and vegetables 
such as tomatoes and berries from Mexico (apparently designed to 
counteract Mexican comparative advantages in labor costs, lower 
humidity and a more favorable winter climate);30 
● Elimination of Chapter 19 (AD/CVD binational panel) review 
of unfair trade practice actions taken by the United States;31 
● Conversion of state-to-state dispute settlement (Chapter 20) 
into a less legal and more diplomatic means for resolving disputes over 
the interpretation and application of NAFTA provisions, by allowing 
the United States to ignore panel decisions that in the view of the 
United States are “clearly erroneous”;32 
● A provision that would allow a Party (e.g., the United States) to 
opt out of ISDS protection for inward investment, without necessarily 
providing reciprocal protection for Mexico and Canadian 
 
 29.  David Lawder, U.S. Seeks to Include Steel, Aluminum in NAFTA Autos Rules-
Sources, CNBC (Oct. 13, 2017, 12:12 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/13/reuters-
america-exclusive-u-s-seeks-to-include-steel-aluminum-in-nafta-autos-rules-sources.html 
(noting also the proposal for a 50 percent U.S. specific content and an increase in the total 
North American content to 85 percent). 
 30.  See Caitlin Dewey, How a Group of Florida Growers Could Help Derail NAFTA, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/how-a-
group-of-florida-tomato-growers-could-help-derail-nafta/2017/10/16/e1ec5438-b27c-11e7-
a908-a3470754bbb9_story.html?utm_term=.92fc11aa67c7 (noting efforts of Florida tomato 
growers to increase their protection against Mexican competition). 
 31.  Josh Wingrove & Eric Martin, U.S. Proposes Gutting NAFTA Legal-Dispute 
Tribunals, BLOOMBERG MARKETS (Oct. 14, 2017, 6:41 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-14/u-s-is-said-to-propose-gutting-nafta-
legal-dispute-tribunals. (The mechanism is applicable as well to Canadian and Mexican 
administrative actions.) 
 32.  Id.  
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governments;33  
● Removing the highly contentious provisions in NAFTA which 
permit Mexican and United States cross-border carriage of goods by 
motor freight on a reciprocal basis;34 and 
● A “sunset” provision under which a revised NAFTA could be 
reviewed and terminated by the United States after five years based on 
yet undefined criteria, throwing the entire process into further 
uncertainty. 
If the United States negotiators insist on these changes without 
modification it is highly unlikely in my view that NAFTA will remain 
in force for the future.  Many if not most of these proposals are also 
questioned (although not unanimously) by some U.S. stakeholders and 
some in Congress,35 including those in the garment industry that 
depend on cross-border supply chains.36 However, should the United 
States decide to show some flexibility, there appears to be some room 
for compromise, although Mexico and Canada may present a list of 
demands as well. The proposed new U.S. content requirement for auto 
rules of origin (ROO) is probably non-negotiable; Canada countered 
with a suggestion of increasing the North American (not American) 
regional content amount to 85.% but only through including research 
and development, an offer quickly rejected by Ambassador Lighthizer 
on the grounds that it would not increase the North American content 
significantly above the 62.5%.    
Other major roadblocks include proposed changes in textile 
ROOs and increased trade remedy protection for winter fruits and 
vegetables, along with the virtual elimination of all dispute settlement 
mechanisms.  
That being said, it is possible to envision compromises in 
government procurement (some limits to Canadian and Mexican 
 
 33.  See generally id. 
 34.  USTR Considering a Carveout for Cross-Border Trucking Services in NAFTA, 
WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Oct. 6, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/ustr-considering-
carveout-cross-border-trucking-services-nafta; see also In the Matter of Cross-Border 
Trucking Services, (U.S. v. Mex.), No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01, at 6 (NAFTA Secretariat). 
 35.  See generally Vicki Needham, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Official Calls U.S. 
NAFTA Proposals ‘Highly Dangerous’, THE HILL (Oct. 10, 2017, 6:01 PM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/354331-us-chamber-of-commerce-calls-trumps-nafta-
proposals-highly-dangerous. 
 36.  Alexandra Stratton, As NAFTA Tension Mounts, Retailers Warn of Economic 
Catastrophe, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 17, 2017, 1:44 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-17/as-nafta-tension-mounts-retailers-
warn-of-economic-catastrophe. 
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access to U.S. procurement, but at a reasonable level rather than based 
on reciprocity) and a “sunset” clause that would be effective only if at 
least two Parties supported termination or that required review without 
automatic termination as Mexico is proposing37  Still, as a Mexican 
proposal in November indicates, restricting government procurement 
in the United States by Mexican and Canadian firms is 
counterproductive. Mexico, probably not seriously, has proposed that 
government procurement be reciprocal in a revised NAFTA based on 
effective access. Thus, U.S. procurement sales in Mexico would be 
limited to Mexico’s procurement sales in the United States (which are 
negligible).38 (Government procurement between the United States and 
Canada would be relatively unaffected by the termination of NAFTA’s 
Government Procurement Chapter 10, since both countries are parties 
to the WTO’s more comprehensive Government Procurement 
Agreement, which was revised and expanded in 2015.39) 
Elimination of Chapter 19 review of national unfair trade practice 
administrative determinations is a non-starter for Canada because the 
earlier and nearly identical Chapter 19 in the United States-Canada 
Free Trade Agreement (“CFTA”)40, was a quid pro quo for Canada’s 
acceptance of the CFTA. It was a principal ground offered by then 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney for support in the 1987 election that 
was effectively a plebiscite on the CFTA. The lack of Canadian trust 
in U.S. federal trade courts was a significant concern in Canada, and 
Prime Minister Mulroney assured Canadians that the trade agreement 
would not have been accepted without the mechanism.41 Moreover, 
shortly after the U.S. imposition of antidumping and countervailing 
duties (“CVD”) on U.S. exports of softwood lumber in the latest round 
of a 30-year-old trade dispute, the Canadian government filed a 
 
 37.  Reports: Mexico to Propose Five-Year Review of NAFTA to Counter U.S. Sunset 
Clause, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Nov. 16, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/reports-
mexico-propose-five-year-review-nafta-counter-us-sunset-clause. 
 38.  Sources: Mexico Tables Government Procurement Proposal Based on Reciprocal 
Effective Access, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Nov. 21, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/daily-
news/sources-mexico-tables-government-procurement-proposal-based-reciprocal-effective-
access. 
 39.  Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA): Parties Observers and Accessions, 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm (showing that Canada and the 
United States became parties to the GPA as of January 1, 1995). 
 40.  U.S.-Can. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), Can.-U.S., Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1989). 
 41.  See The Significance of NAFTA’s Chapter 19, GHY (July 27, 2017), 
http://www.ghy.com/trade-compliance/the-significance-of-naftas-chapter-19/ (explaining the 
historical and political significance of the provision for Canada). 
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Chapter 19 challenge to the CVD ruling.42 Still, a modified version of 
Chapter 19, with a more effective appellate process, is not beyond the 
realm of possibility, and a few commentators suggest that if Canada 
were to receive sufficient economic benefits in return, such as 
maintaining full access to the U.S. government procurement market, 
Canada might accept termination of Chapter 19.43 
Effective elimination or emasculation of the Chapter 20 state-to-
state dispute settlement mechanism may be negotiable for Canada and 
Mexico, simply because Chapter 20 has been so ineffective, with the 
most recent panel decision issued in February 2001.44 Since Chapter 
20 has worked poorly (particularly in the sense of avoiding delays in 
the appointment of the five panelists) the NAFTA Parties have learned 
to make do with  the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, with more or 
less satisfactory results.. With cross-border trucking, in my view (as 
one of five panelists in the 2001 decision) neither the U.S. nor the 
Mexican governments if pressed would expend substantial political 
capital on maintaining reciprocal access for U.S. and Mexican 
truckers. It has resulted in bitter disputes between the U.S. Executive 
Branch and organized labor’s supporters in Congress (which are 
continuing), multiple court actions, and in 2009-10 Mexican punitive 
tariffs worth an estimated $2.4 billion on U.S. exports to Mexico.45 
That being said, some industry groups have lobbied the Administration 
to preserve the trucking provisions.46 
Making the ISDS provisions of NAFTA subject to an opt-out 
provision, or eliminating them entirely, would anger many members 
of the U.S. business community who have long insisted on the 
inclusion of ISDS provisions in U.S. trade agreements, treating ISDS 
as a “red line.”47 In January, Canada and Mexico appeared to support 
 
 42.  Canada Files NAFTA Challenge Against U.S. in Softwood Lumber Dispute, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE (Nov. 16, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/canada-files-nafta-
challenge-against-us-softwood-lumber-dispute (noting the filing even though the case is not 
yet final with regard to the injury determination). 
 43.  See id. (quoting Robert Wolfe, professor emeritus at Queens University, Kingston).  
 44.  Cross-Border Trucking Services, supra note 34. 
 45.  William B. Cassidy, Mexican Trucking Past U.S. Border in Crosshairs, JOC.COM 
(Feb. 13, 2017, 4:33 PM), https://www.joc.com/trucking-logistics/truckload-freight/politics-
economics-collide-us-mexico-truck-crossings_20170213.html (discussing the history of the 
dispute). 
 46.  100+ Industry Groups Urge Lighthizer to Preserve NAFTA’s Trucking Provisions, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Nov. 17, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/100-industry-
groups-urge-lighthizer-preserve-naftas-trucking-provisions. 
 47.  See Shawn Donnan & Jude Webber, Bitter Differences Over NAFTA Break Into the 
Open, FINANCIAL TIMES, (Oct. 17, 2017) available at https://www.ft.com/content/058aa538-
b387-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399 (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) (noting inter alia that the business 
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retaining ISDS under Chapter 11 even if the United States were to 
decide to opt out.  USTR Robert Lighthizer, who is spearheading the 
drive to eliminate Chapter because he views it as an unfair subsidy for 
business, is well aware that Chapter 11 (investment) has long been a 
flash point for anti-NAFTA union groups and activists, whose support 
could be critical in obtaining Congressional approval for a revised 
NAFTA. 48 By late February, it appeared that both Canada and Mexico 
were prepared to join the United States in eliminating ISDS.49   
Others have and will continue to speculate on what level of 
compromise, if any, might be possible if the negotiations continue into 
April and beyond.  For example, would the United States ever accept 
Canada’s proposed gender and indigenous rights chapter, language 
that might well appeal to some Democrats in Congress if the revised 
agreement were also to include elimination of ISDS and stronger labor 
and environmental chapters?50  
Although the focus here and elsewhere has been on U.S. 
demands, it is obvious that the other two Parties have key objectives 
as well, even if their first is “do no harm” while giving the Trump 
Administration a “win.”51  Mexican authorities have expressed an 
interest in modernization of NAFTA, including incorporating energy, 
enhanced financial services and an updated agreement. They also may 
seek to reinstate a long-stalled guest worker program in the United 
States and incentives to encourage small and medium-sized businesses 
to trade internationally. However, Mexican negotiators have indicated 
that they will resist any U.S. proposals to impose tariffs on regional 
trade and eliminate the Chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism for 
unfair trade disputes.52 While the avoidance of damage is foremost for 
Canada as well (including the retention of  Chapter 19), modernizing 
innovations have been suggested, including a chapter on gender rights 
and indigenous rights as noted above, addressing climate change in the 
environmental chapter, provisions on “regulatory alignment” and 
 
community has long pressured the government to include ISDS in trade agreements). 
 48.  See id. (reporting on such views). 
 49.  Sources: Canada to Promise Eliminating ISDS at Meeting this Week; USTR to Agree, 
WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Feb. 21, 2018). 
 50.  Simon Lester, Lighthizer’s Trade Optimism, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Oct. 20, 
2017, 7:18 AM), http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/10/lighthizers-trade-
optimism.html (discussing various possible compromises). 
 51.  Kate Linthicum, Mexico Enters New NAFTA Negotiations with Delicate Task: Give 
President Trump a ‘Win’ but Do No Harm, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-nafta-20170814-story.html 
(discussing how Mexico wishes to avoid a renegotiated NAFTA at their expense). 
 52.  Id. 
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extending government procurement to state and provincial 
governments, expanding the categories for temporary entry of business 
persons to other professions.53  
Even those who oppose many of the Administration’s new 
proposals agree that NAFTA, twenty-five years after its signature 
(December 1992), could benefit significantly from modernization, 
starting with many of the chapters that the United States, Canada and 
Mexico agreed upon as part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
negotiations.54 Among the areas which in my view could be included 
are the following: 
● Improved investor state dispute settlement (with greater host 
country regulatory flexibility, as reflected in Chapter 9 of TPP; 
● Better labor protections, particularly in Mexico, as reflected in 
Chapter 19 of TPP; 
● Improved environmental protections, as reflected in Chapter 20 
of TPP; 
● Improved competition law disciplines, as reflected in Chapter 
16 of TPP; 
● Increased support for small and medium-sized enterprises, as 
reflected in Chapter 24 of TPP; 
● Better regulation of state owned enterprises (e.g., Pemex and 
CFE), as reflected in Chapter 17 of TPP; 
● Inclusion of E-commerce and data protection/digital economy, 
as reflected in Chapter 14 of TPP; 
● Improved government procurement, as reflected in Chapter 15 
of TPP, including coverage of procurement by state and provincial 
government; 
● Inclusion of “TRIPs-Plus” expanded protection for intellectual 
property, as provided in Chapter 18 of TPP;55 
● Incorporation of new Mexican energy laws that permit foreign 
 
 53.  Cyndee Todgham Cherniak, Canada Releases List of NAFTA Modernization “Core 
Objectives”, CANADA-U.S. BLOG (Aug. 15, 2017), http://www.canada-
usblog.com/2017/08/15/canada-releases-list-of-nafta-modernization-core-objectives/. 
 54.  TPP Final Table of Contents, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-
text.  
 55.  Id. (for text and explanation of each of these TPP chapters). 
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(and domestic) private investment in the sector56 in NAFTA Chapter 
6; and 
● Better U.S. access to the highly restricted Canadian dairy and 
egg market.57 
Some progress has been made on these modernization issues as 
March 2018. Chapters addressing regulatory cooperation, digital trade 
and food safety are among the handful that has been completed.58 
Still, the legal, political and practical obstacles to such changes, 
along with the Administration’s controversial demands as discussed 
earlier, suggest a strong possibility that the renegotiation will fail. The 
considerations include the following: 
● The President and many Trump Administration officials, 
including Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, economic adviser Peter 
Navarro and USTR Robert Lighthizer, strongly favor bilateral over 
multiple party trade agreements;59 more generally, these anti-trade, 
“America-First” officials remain engaged in an internal debate with 
more moderate advisers such as Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, 
former National Economic Council head Gary Cohn, Chief of Staff 
John Kelly and national security adviser General McMaster, who are 
either pro-trade or fear the adverse political consequences of U.S. anti-
globalization economic policy;60 
● Earlier Administration statements have been aggressively 
critical of Mexico and have already damaged the negotiating 
atmosphere; Mexican authorities may well walk away if Trump 
negotiators are considered unreasonable or disrespectful again as the 
 
 56.  Naki Mendoza, Mexico’s Energy Reforms: Bearing Fruit at Last, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/2d540f64-793a-11e7-a3e8-60495fe6ca71 
(discussing the impact of permitting foreign investment in the Mexican energy sector in 2013). 
 57.  Rosella Brevetti, NAFTA Talks Could Face Stormy Negotiations in Round Four, 34 
INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) (Oct. 12, 2017) (listing dairy as one of the most contentious issues 
between the United States and Canada in the Oct. 11–15 negotiating round). 
 58.  Brevetti, NAFTA Talks Move on Modernization Issues, supra note 7. 
 59.  Bilateral or Multilateral: Which Trade Partnerships Work Best?, KNOWLEDGE @ 
WHARTON (Apr. 27, 2017), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/bilateral-multilateral-
trade-partnerships-work-best/ (discussing the potential benefits and disadvantages of bilateral 
trade agreements, with reference to the views of Navarro and the president); see also Vicki 
Needham, Ross Prefers Inking Bilateral Trade Agreements, THE HILL (Jan. 18, 2017, 1:03 
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/314846-ross-prefers-inking-bilateral-trade-agreements 
(quoting Ross’ preference at his confirmation hearings). 
 60.  Ana Swanson, Trump’s America First Trade Agenda Roiled by Internal Divisions, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/politics/trumps-
america-first-trade-agenda-roiled-by-internal-divisions.html?_r=0. 
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negotiations progress;61 
● Key issues will be under discussion in the run-up to and 
probably well beyond the July 1, 2018 Mexican presidential election, 
and unresolved under the current Pena Nieto Administration even if 
the negotiations can be concluded before July; 
● Given the highly controversial nature of NAFTA, the 
November 2018 U.S. Congressional elections may make NAFTA a 
lightning rod for many candidates of both major political parties, with 
support in Congress far less common than criticism;  
● The President and Administration officials who should know 
better ignore trade in services, where the United States maintains a 
significant trade surplus with both Mexico and Canada;62 and 
● The imposition by the Trump Administration in March 2018 on 
alleged “national security” grounds of 25 percent tariffs on imported 
steel and 10% on imported aluminum may affect the negotiations even 
though initially Canada and Mexico were excluded,63 and both have 
rejected any linkages between exceptions to these trade restraints and 
concessions in the NAFTA talks.64 
Thus, in my view, the Administration may ultimately be faced 
with the difficult choice among: 1) compromising on its most 
protectionist (and unreasonable) demands and accepting a useful 
revision that fails to meet key Administration objectives, 2) 
terminating NAFTA entirely (See Part VI); or 3) permitting the 
negotiations to continue at some level until after the Mexican 
presidential and U.S. Congressional elections, that is, until January 
2019 or beyond. Because of continuing risk of termination by the 
United States, in the next section I review some of the alternatives to 
NAFTA for Canada and for Mexico, and focus on the impact of 
NAFTA termination on the U.S. auto/auto parts and agricultural 
 
 61.  See Jon Lee Anderson, How Mexico Deals with Trump, NEW YORKER (Oct. 9, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/09/mexico-in-the-age-of-trump (discussing 
inter alia the challenges for Mexico in finding common ground on NAFTA with the Trump 
Administration). 
 62.  $7.6 billion and $24.6 billion (2016), respectively. See US-Mexico Trade Facts and 
US-Canada Trade Facts, USTR supra note 15. 
 63. Andrew Mayeda & Jennifer Epstein, Trump Signs Tariff Order on Metals with Wiggle 
Room for Allies, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-08/trump-to-sign-steel-tariff-order-with-
wiggle-room-for-allies.  
 64.  Canada, Mexico Reject Linkage of Steel and Aluminum Tariffs to NAFTA Talks, 
WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Mar. 12, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/canada-mexico-
reject-linkage-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-nafta-talks. 
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sectors, the two most significantly impacted by NAFTA termination. 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO NAFTA IN A POST-NAFTA NORTH AMERICA 
A. Alternatives for Canada 
Despite the rhetoric, the U.S. trade deficit with Canada is 
relatively small, about $12.5 billion worth on $627.8 billion worth of 
trade in 2016,65, including a huge deficit in petroleum products given 
that Canada is the United States’ top source of crude oil imports.66  
While the Administration said early in 2017 that the US-Canada 
relationship only requires “tweaking,”67 more recently it has attacked 
Canada on dairy and softwood lumber,68 and tentatively imposed huge 
penalty duties (now terminated) on imports of commercial aircraft 
manufactured by Bombardier principally in Quebec.69  Still, the 
situation is different from that with Mexico if the United States 
withdraws from NAFTA. Under the 1993 NAFTA Implementation 
Act the 1998 Free Trade Agreement between the United States and 
Canada (CFTA)70 is “superseded” by that Act, but automatically enters 
into force again if NAFTA is terminated.71 (Of course, the Trump 
administration could also attempt to terminate CFTA as well.) 
 
 65.  USTR, U.S.-Canada Trade Facts, available at https://ustr.gov/countries-
regions/americas/canada (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 66.  Robert Rapier, Where America Gets its Oil: The Top 10 Foreign Suppliers of Crude 
to the U.S., FORBES (Apr. 11, 2016, 11:09 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2016/04/11/where-america-gets-its-oil-the-top-10-
suppliers-of-u-s-oil-imports/#5067edaa264c. Canada exported 3.2 million barrels per day; 
Saudi Arabia was a distant second at 1.1 million bpd, while Mexico was fourth with 690,000 
bpd. 
 67.  Andrea Hopkins, Trump Expects Only ‘Tweaking’ of Trade Relationship with 
Canada, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2017, 6:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-
canada/trump-expects-only-tweaking-of-trade-relationship-with-canada-idUSKBN15S14S. 
 68.  Anna Isaac, At Loggerheads: How a Canada-US Trade War Could Give Us All 
Splinters, YAHOO! FINANCE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/loggerheads-
canada-us-trade-war-143543864.html (discussing the disputes over aircraft, dairy, and 
softwood lumber). 
 69.  See Frederic Tomesco and Andrew Mayeda, Bombardier Gets Surprise Win as U.S. 
Rejects Boeing Trade Case, 35 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) (Feb. 1, 2018) (noting that the 
imposition of almost 300 percent antidumping and countervailing duties on commercial 
aircraft made in Canada was negated by the USITC’s negative injury finding). 
 70.  The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 40.  
 71.  North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 
501 (c)(3), 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 3311–3317 (2011)) (providing in 
pertinent part that “[o]n the date the United States and Canada agree to suspend the operation 
of the [CFTA] by reason of the entry into force between them of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, the following provisions of this Act are suspended and shall remain 
suspended until such time as the suspension of the [CFTA] may be terminated[].”). 
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The CFTA carries most of the same duty-free trade benefits, and 
could be modernized over a period of several years if the Parties and 
Congress were to agree, but lacks ISDS and agricultural and service 
market access comparable to NAFTA, among other differences. In the 
interim, CFTA could allow Canada to escape some of the dangers of a 
failure of NAFTA renegotiation with Mexico. Virtually all duties on 
manufactured goods became duty-free and quota-free under CFTA and 
NAFTA no later than 1998.72 Also, if the United States were to 
terminate its participation in NAFTA, Canada (with Mexico’s 
concurrence) could decide to keep NAFTA in force for those two 
countries. This could be a positive factor for various reasons, including 
but not limited to maintaining Mexico as an important source for auto 
parts to be used in Canadian auto production, including for automotive 
exports to the European Union under CETA,73 and allowing Canada to 
replace the United States as a source of insurance and related financial 
services now provided by the United States under NAFTA’s 
government procurement chapter.  
Still, Canadian industries (including but not limited to autos) are 
highly dependent on imported parts and components from the United 
States as well as those from  Mexico. Thus, Canadian auto producers 
would be adversely affected unless the Canadian Government were to 
reduce its tariffs on key parts imports to zero, or take other steps to 
assure a continuing supply of duty-free parts and components. The 
prospect of duty-free auto and auto parts trade with Canada’s other 
“Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership,” the revised TPP74, could also have a significant impact 
on post-NAFTA Canadian auto and auto parts production and trade, 
and assure duty-free automotive trade with Mexico even if NAFTA 
were to disappear as between Canada and Mexico. 
Politically, Canadian relations with Mexico as well as with the 
rest of Latin America could suffer if Canada does not stand with 
 
 72.  Elimination of Tariffs Under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 
GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/fta-ale/tariff-accel.aspx?lang=eng (last 
modified Mar. 17, 2017) (stating “Tariffs on qualifying goods traded between Canada and the 
United States became duty free on January 1, 1998, in accordance with the Canada-United 
States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) which was carried forward under NAFTA for goods 
traded between Canada and the United States”). 
 73.  Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement [Canada, EU], Oct. 30, 2016 
(entered into force Sep. 21, 2017), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf.  
 74.  New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, CPTPP, 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-concluded-
but-not-in-force/cptpp/ (signed Mar. 8, 2018). 
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Mexico to provide a unified front during the negotiations and any 
suspension of them, since if that occurs it will appear to many that 
Canada has abandoned Mexico and consequently made it more 
difficult for Mexico to reach an acceptable revised agreement.  
Although Canadian trade relations with Latin America pale by 
comparison with the United States, Canada has concluded free trade 
agreements with more than twenty countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, including Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, Panama and Peru.75 
The Canadian economy will be less adversely affected by the 
termination of NAFTA and by other U.S. anti-trade policies if the 
threat encourages Canada to go beyond the CPTPP, CETA and the 
Canada-Korea FTA toward bilateral FTAs with other nations, such as 
the MERCOSUR group (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) 
and China. Such steps might at least begin to reduce the heavy 
dependency of the Canadian and Mexican economies on exports to the 
United States (about 78 percent of total Canadian exports and 81 
percent of Mexican exports)76 by encouraging the developing of new 
markets.  However, this is a medium to long term process which is not 
likely to have a significant impact for five years or more. 
In services, Canada is already benefitting from liberal 
immigration policies for high-tech professionals (including recent 
college graduates), which may further encourage U.S. high-tech firms 
(e.g., Apple, Amazon, Microsoft) to expand their operations in 
Vancouver and Toronto,77 and depending on U.S. immigration policies 
are likely to continue benefitting from high-tech professional 
immigration in the foreseeable future. 
B. Alternatives for Mexico 
What happens to Mexican exports to the United States if NAFTA 
is terminated as between the United States and Mexico?  The following 
 
 75.  Trade and Investment Agreements, GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA, 
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/index.aspx?lang=eng (last modified Nov. 11, 2017). 
 76.  Daniel Workman, Canada’s Top Trading Partners, WORLD’S TOP EXPORTS (Feb. 14, 
2018), http://www.worldstopexports.com/canadas-top-import-partners/; Daniel Workman, 
Mexico’s Top Trading Partners, WORLD’S TOP EXPORTS (Jan. 26, 2018), 
http://www.worldstopexports.com/mexicos-top-import-partners/.  
 77.  Joel Rose, Canada’s Tech Firms Capitalize on Immigration Anxiety in the Age of 
Trump, NPR (June 9, 2017, 11:46 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/06/09/532220824/canadas-
tech-firms-capitalize-on-immigration-anxiety-in-the-age-of-trump (noting inter alia that 
international tech workers, including those from the United States, can get a work permit in 
only two weeks). 
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are key factors but quantifying the effects is difficult: 
● Assuming no draconian, WTO-illegal new trade barriers, Most 
Favored Nations (“MFN) tariffs between Mexico and US could be 
reinstated and other WTO rules, such as the Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Agreement (TRIPS)78 would continue to apply; 
● The weighted average of Mexican applied import tariffs is 
about 7.1%, while the weighted average for Canada is 4.2%, and 3.7% 
for Mexican exports to the United States (keeping in mind that 
Mexico’s bound tariffs average 36.1%).79 Effects of reverting to WTO 
tariffs vary by sector (with textile, clothing and footwear tariffs, and 
agricultural tariffs being well above the MFN average, but only an 
estimated 15 percent of Mexican exports to the United States subject 
to tariffs above five percent80). In other sectors some increase in 
consumer prices and reduction in cross-border trade is likely when 
tariffs are passed on to consumers, but other factors such as a peso 
devaluation and the elimination of the costs of complying with rules of 
origin would likely offset the increased tariffs to some degree; 
● United States, third country, and probably Mexican domestic-
source investment would be discouraged, at least for a time, resulting 
in slower growth in Mexico,81 although the impact on the deficit as well 
as on trade volumes is uncertain. Despite the disruption of supply 
changes and possible relocation of some U.S. enterprises away from 
North America, relatively low U.S. MFN tariffs and the other 
advantages of producing goods for the U.S. market in Mexico would 
remain (and would likely assure a significant, if somewhat reduced, 
volume of manufactured exports to the United States post-NAFTA).82 
Relevant factors working in Mexico’s favor include the importance of 
 
 78.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, 33 I.L.M. 81, available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.  
 79.  World Tariff Profiles 2013, WTO, INT’L TRADE CTR., UN CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. 
54, 115, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles13_e.pdf (last visited Oct. 
5, 2017); see also Mary Amiti and Caroline Freund, U.S. Exporters Could Face High Tariffs 
without NAFTA, LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Apr. 17, 2017), 
http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2017/04/us-exporters-could-face-high-tariffs-
without-nafta.html. 
 80.  Amiti & Freund, supra note 79. 
 81.  Fitch: ‘Significant Uncertainty’ for Mexico’s Economy if U.S. Leaves NAFTA, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE (Oct. 30, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/trade/fitch-significant-uncertainty-
mexicos-economy-if-us-leaves-nafta (quoting a report by Fitch Ratings). 
 82.  Ana Swanson and Kevin Granville, What Would Happen if the U.S. Withdrew from 
NAFTA, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/business/economy/what-would-happen-if-the-us-
withdrew-from-nafta.html (discussing the impact of terminating NAFTA on various industrial 
sectors). 
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long-established interconnected supply chains, geographical proximity 
to the United States compared to Asia, lower cost labor, and heavy 
prior investment in well-established facilities with skilled labor that 
could only be abandoned with great financial cost to their owners. In 
many cases, the costs of developing alternative manufacturing sites 
and supply chains could be foregone in place of simply raising prices 
as feasible to consumers;83 
● Many other protections for American industry, such as those 
related to investment, rules of origin, labor and environment, common 
customs procedures and some services market access, would disappear 
should NAFTA be terminated, since WTO rules do not extend, inter-
alia, to investment, labor or environmental protection, and are limited 
in scope for services. 
Moreover, a focus on trade alone ignores other important aspects 
of the U.S.-Mexico relationship and cooperation, including security 
and terrorism; reducing illegal immigration by keeping the Mexican 
economy stronger than would otherwise be the case; interdicting and 
returning migrants from Mexico, Central America and further south; 
and seizing of illicit drugs and extradition of drug lords.84 The 
Administration’s bitter rhetoric may encourage anti-U.S. sentiment 
that results in support during the presidential campaign of the populist 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador.85 
Only a minority of Americans are aware of the complex history 
of United States-Mexican history. Those know that from the 1840s, 
with the Mexican-American War, after additional threats of invasions 
by the United States and the transfer of more than half of Mexican 
territory to the United States by 1852, relations were either arms-length 
or hostile for most of the past 180 years.86  In point of fact, the two 
countries have enjoyed a strong, cooperative relationship for only 
about the past 30 years,87 beginning in the mid- 1980s when Mexico 
began opening its economy and joined the GATT.88    
 
 83.  Fitch, supra note 81. 
 84.  U.S. Relations with Mexico, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35749.htm (discussing broad ranges of cooperative 
activities, including those relating to drugs and border security and interdiction of illicit funds 
and arms).  
 85.  Anderson, supra note 61 (discussing the prospects of López Obrador’s election). 
 86.  Id. (noting the relevance in Mexico of this and other historical incidents to the current 
negotiations). 
 87.  Id. (discussing the historical baggage between the United States and Mexico). 
 88.  Mexico and the WTO, WTO (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/mexico_e.htm (noting that Mexico joined 
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If anyone gains from the destruction of NAFTA, it is likely to be 
Mexico’s other trading partners and investors, including Argentina, 
Brazil, Canada (which would likely remain a NAFTA partner), China, 
Japan and the EU, as Mexico makes serious efforts to diversify its 
exports.89 Among the recent developments is a fast-track effort by 
Mexico and the European Union to modernize their 2000 Free Trade 
Agreement,90 and efforts by the Mexican president to stimulate trade 
with and investment from China.91 
Many of the factors discussed in the next section focusing on the 
automotive industry would affect other manufacturing sectors as well. 
C. Auto and Auto Parts Industry 
The auto and auto parts industry are a key aspect of North 
American economic relations.  North American auto production is the 
third largest in the world, after China and the European Union, with 
one source estimating approximately 24.5 million, 18.2 million and 
17.9 million, respectively, in 2015.92  Within North America, the 
United States produced about 12.1 million units, Mexico, 3.6 million 
units and Canada, 2.3 million units.93  Trade in this sector currently 
accounts for at least 20 percent of total NAFTA trade,94 in part because 
some automotive components cross the Canadian and/or Mexican 
borders as many as eight times before they are incorporated into a 
finished automobile in a final assembly plant in one of the three 
NAFTA countries.95   
 
the GATT on Aug. 24, 1986).  
 89.  Nicholás Misculin, Mexico, Looking South, Sees Trade Deal with Argentina Around 
Year’s End, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-
mexico/mexico-looking-south-sees-trade-deal-with-argentina-around-years-end-
idUSKBN17K2HC. 
 90.  Countries and Regions: Mexico, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/mexico/ (last visited Oct. 8, 
2017) (discussing the negotiations).  
 91.  Mexico President to Visit China to Boost Trade Amid NAFTA Talks, REUTERS (Aug. 
26, 2017, 3:26 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta-mexico-china/mexico-
president-to-visit-china-to-boost-trade-amid-nafta-talks-idUSKCN1B820S (discussing 
Mexico’s efforts to increase trade with Latin America and Asia). 
 92.  2016 Production Statistics, OICA, http://www.oica.net/category/production-
statistics/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2017). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  US-Mexico Trade Facts and US-Canada Trade Facts, supra note 15 (showing 
automotive trade of approximately $200 billion (exports and imports) under NAFTA).  
 95.  See Dziczek, et al., NAFTA Briefing: Trade benefits to the automotive industry and 
potential consequences of withdrawal from the agreement, CENTER FOR AUTOMOTIVE 
RESEARCH 7 (Jan. 2017), http://www.cargroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/nafta_briefing_january_2017_public_version-final.pdf. 
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A complex mix of factors exists which may make the net impact 
on the volume of auto production in post-NAFTA North America less 
severe than might otherwise be the case, even though the impact on 
U.S. auto and auto parts production, and on U.S. competitiveness in 
the auto industry world-wide, is likely to be adverse.  Should NAFTA 
duty-free, quota-free entry of autos and auto parts into the United 
States be terminated, the applicable U.S. MFN duties are 2.5 percent 
on autos, around 3.1 percent on most auto parts, but 25 percent on light 
trucks.96  In the other direction, Canadian tariffs are about 6 percent 
while Mexican applied tariffs are typically around 5-6% although 
some vehicles are subject to much higher tariff rates.97 
The overall impact on the North American auto industry and 
particularly on the U.S. auto and auto parts industry depends on many 
factors which may not affect all models and all current supply chains 
in the same manner: 
● Elimination of NAFTA 62.5% regional value content rule of 
origin means more and less expensive auto parts could be imported 
into Mexico from Asia (or into Canada) for use in Mexican and 
Canadian auto production for export to the United States, or for United 
States domestic production, particularly from current suppliers for 
such expensive components as engines (Japan, China and South 
Korea);98  
● Such changes would likely cause a decrease in employment and 
output for auto parts producers in all NAFTA Parties, but particularly 
for the United States (estimated at up to 50,000 job losses out of a total 
of about 870,000 current jobs, including parts and finished vehicles),99 
given that the United States is usually the high cost producer 
(particularly with the current U.S. dollar—Canadian dollar exchange 
 
 96.  BILL CANIS, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44907, NAFTA AND MOTOR VEHICLE 
TRADE (2017). 
 97.  See Mexico Trade at a Glance: Most Recent Values, WORLD INTEGRATED TRADE 
SOLUTION, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/MEX (last visited Oct. 2017) 
(showing Mexico’s applied simple average tariff of 6.1 percent); Andrei Sulzenko, The U.S. 
Has a Weak NAFTA Hand on Autos—Canada and Mexico Should Stay Cool, THE GLOBE & 
MAIL (Aug. 17, 2017), https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-
commentary/the-us-has-a-weak-nafta-hand-on-autos-canada-and-mexico-should-stay-
cool/article36011401/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com& (reporting a  6 percent tariff 
for Canada on autos and parts). 
98. CANIS ET AL., supra note 96, at 8. 
 99.  David Lawder, Ending NAFTA Could Cost U.S. up to 50,000 Auto Parts Jobs: Study, 
REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2007, 9:34 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta-
autos/ending-nafta-could-cost-u-s-up-to-50000-auto-parts-jobs-study-idUSKBN1CH1Z4.  
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rates);100 
● Post-NAFTA, under WTO rules, Mexican MFN import duties 
on parts and components imported from Asia or US can be rebated 
under WTO rules when the finished vehicles are exported to the United 
States and Canada (or anywhere else),101 and auto parts could be 
imported duty free from Mexico’s many FTA partners, including Japan 
and the European Union;102 
● Elimination of ROO for U.S. automakers would likely save 
them 2-3% in the administrative costs of complying with ROO, 
including but not limited obtaining certificates of NAFTA origin from 
the Mexican manufacturers and the complex calculations for auto 
industry ROO, which require tracing of the origin of parts used in the 
production of subassemblies such as engines and transmissions,103 
although adjusting to a new trade relationship within North America 
will carry some administrative costs at least for a few years; 
● Further devaluation of the peso, which has historically taken 
place consistently from 1995 through 2016,104 even by just a few 
percentage points, could reduce much of the impact of higher (MFN) 
duties on imports of autos and some auto parts from Mexico by making 
Mexican exports relatively less expensive in U.S. dollar terms; 
● North American supply chains and “just in time” 
manufacturing would be somewhat disrupted at least for several years, 
and the overall additional cost of less efficient supply chains in terms 
of global competitiveness cannot be discounted, although some such 
costs would be temporary; 
● Some automobile models currently assembled in Mexico or in 
the United States might be produced in China, Korea or elsewhere in 
 
 100.  As of March 13, 2018, a Canadian dollar was worth 0.77 U.S. dollars, effectively a 





 101.  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, Annex I(i) (Apr. 15, 1994) (if 
the remission of duties are not more than the imported duties paid on imported inputs). 
 102.  CANIS ET AL., supra note 96, at 8. 
 103.  See NAFTA supra note 2, Article 403: Automotive Goods (specifying the tracing 
rules or origin). 
 104.  The value of the peso has fallen from a high of below 4:1 in 1995 to a low of nearly 
22:1 in 2016. See US Dollar Peso Exchange Rate (USD MXN) – Historical Chart, 
MACROTRENDS, http://www.macrotrends.net/2559/us-dollar-mexican-peso-exchange-rate-
historical-chart (last visited May 11, 2018). 
GANTZ - RISKS AND REWARDS OF RENEGOTIATING NAFTA (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2018  1:51 PM 
2018] THE NORTH AMERICAN TRADE RELATIONSHIP 151 
Asia instead, given that the MFN tariff is only 2.5%, but cheaper 
Chinese labor, along with Chinese parts and components may not 
outweigh the other advantages of producing particularly small cars in 
Mexico given the installed factory capacity, highly skilled Mexican 
workers, low transportation costs and other factors such as favorable 
exchange rates as noted above;  
● Small truck production (GM and Fiat-Chrysler currently 
produce about one third of their light trucks in Mexico) because of the 
prohibitive 25 percent U.S. MFN tariff noted earlier would largely be 
halted in Mexico—as already announced105— except for local 
consumption and perhaps for limited exports to third-countries; and 
● In some instances, longstanding U.S. customs rules upon 
importation that tax goods assembled in foreign countries only on the 
non-U.S. content would be applicable to goods assembled in Mexico, 
assuming they could currently or with some modification of the 
industrial processes meet the requirements of the statute.106 
Another possibly significant factor unrelated to NAFTA is the 
decision by the Trump Administration March 1 to impose so-called 
“national security” protective tariffs on imported steel (25 percent) and 
aluminum (15 percent).107 Given that the average auto contains 2,400 
pounds of steel and over 300 pounds of aluminum,108 a substantial 
increase in steel and aluminum prices in the United States could make 
some models less expensive to produce in Mexico or Canada, even 
with the 2.5% import duty.These factors, plus at least some disruption 
of the supply chains that have been established since 1994 for NAFTA 
 
 105.   Julia Horowitz, Fiat Chrysler Will Move Ram Production to Michigan from Mexico, 
CNN MONEY (Jan. 11, 2018), http://money.cnn.com/2018/01/11/news/companies/fiat-
chrysler-tax-reform-bonus-jobs/index.html (reporting on a $1 billion investment in a Michigan 
plant, but indicating that a Saltillo Mexico plant will not be closed). 
 106.  HTSUS item 9802.00.80 reads: “Articles, except goods of heading 9802.00.90 and 
goods imported under provisions of subchapter XIX of this chapter and goods imported under 
provisions of subchapter XX, assembled abroad in whole or in part of fabricated components, 
the product of the United States, which (a) were exported in condition ready for assembly 
without further fabrication, (b) have not lost their physical identity in such articles by change 
in form, shape or otherwise, and (c) have not been advanced in value or improved in condition 
abroad except by being assembled and except by operations incidental to the assembly process 
such as cleaning, lubricating and painting…” See Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 
States, USITC Pub. 4750 (2018). 
 107.  See Trump to Impose 25 Percent Tariff on Steel, 10 Percent on Aluminum, WORLD 
TRADE ONLINE (Mar. 1, 2018), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/trump-impose-25-percent-
tariff-steel-10-percent-aluminum. 
 108.  Julian Murdoch, Cars and Metal, Metal and Cars, ETF.COM (Nov. 17, 2008), 
http://www.etf.com/sections/features-and-news/1289-cars-and-metal-metal-and-
cars?nopaging=1. 
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and Mexico and since 1965 for the United States and Canada through 
the Auto Parts Agreement,109 make predicting new sourcing patters for 
both parts and complete vehicles difficult.     The only certainty is that 
there will be at least some dislocations. 
Given these uncertainties the overall impact on U.S. auto and 
parts production is difficult to assess, particularly after the industry in 
all three countries has time to adjust fully to the changes.  It does not 
seem likely that auto producers in the United States will invest in new 
assembly capacity in the United States, at least in the foreseeable 
future, particularly at a time of declining vehicle consumption and 
increasing steel and aluminum costs. As one expert noted, “costs to 
automakers of expanding in the U.S. would be significant,” and 
producers in Mexico would continue to enjoy many of the same 
comparative advantages of Mexican production post-NAFTA, as well 
as the ability to export autos tariff-free to markets outside North 
America where Mexico has FTAs).110 As noted earlier auto parts 
production in North America, particularly in the high-labor-cost 
Canada and the United States, will probably decline, since sourcing the 
same parts in the Canada and the United States (rather than Mexico) 
would likely result in an increase in parts costs and thus vehicle prices. 
(It is possible that some such increased costs could be reduced through 
investment in greater automation.)  
In the unlikely event that NAFTA is revised to increase the North 
American content requirement from 62.5 percent to over 80 percent, 
and/or impose a 50 percent U.S. content as the United States has 
imposed, the impact would be essentially the same on the auto industry 
as terminating NAFTA.  Most of the same considerations listed above 
would apply, and many or most North American auto producers would 
simply forego NAFTA preferential tariff treatment and operate under 
MFN tariffs in intra-North American trade for vehicles destined to be 
sold in the United States,111 or import fewer finished vehicles from the 
United States post-NAFTA and more from Japan duty-free under the 
CPTPP. 
A possible harbinger of future developments is reflected in the 
decision of the Ford Motor Company to eschew building in Mexico a 
 
 109.  Agreement Concerning Automotive Products Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of Canada, Jan. 27, 1965, GATT Doc. L/2339. 
 110.  Fitch, supra note 81.  
 111.  See Study: Stricter NAFTA Auto Rule of Origin Could Cost 24,000 Jobs, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/study-stricter-nafta-auto-rule-
origin-could-cost-24000-jobs (suggesting that these ROO changes would amount to “basically 
a withdrawal” from NAFTA). 
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new factory for production of the small Ford Focus after criticism from 
President Trump. However, the Focus will not be produced in either 
Mexico or United States, but in China!112 Even today, greater auto 
production of vehicles for the U.S. market is beginning to occur in 
China, as for example with recent Buick Envision SUV imports.113  The 
decision to produce the Focus in China will essentially assure that the 
approximately 46 percent of parts for the Focus when made in the 
United States will be sourced largely from China and other Asian 
suppliers in the future.  Estimates vary widely but approximately 30-
40 percent by value of the parts for Mexican autos assembled for 
export to the U.S. market originates in the United States, while only 4 
percent of vehicles imported into the United States from China 
represent U.S. content.)114 Thus, the Ford decision alone is likely to 
result in a reduction of auto parts production in North America. 
D. United States-Mexico Agricultural Trade Post-NAFTA 
Canada and Mexico are respectively the largest and third largest 
export markets for the United States. U.S. agricultural exports to 
Canada were worth $23 billion on 2016, including prepared food, fresh 
vegetables, fresh fruit, snack foods, and non-alcoholic beverages, with 
imports of $22 billion.115  A comprehensive analysis of the effects of 
NAFTA termination on regional agricultural trade is beyond the scope 
of this section, but is available through the Congressional Research 
Service.116 
U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico are worth about $18 billion 
annually in such product areas as wheat, hops and other grains, corn, 
soy, beef, chicken parts and pork, while imports total $23 billion worth 
in 2016, including mostly fresh vegetables and fruit but also wine and 
beer, processed foods and processed fruits and vegetables.117 Most such 
U.S. export goods are fungible, with Brazil, Argentina, Canada and 
Australia all eager to export more to Mexico, and the Mexican 
Government, with the support of several senators, making initial 
inquiries exploring the shifting of some grain and corn purchases from 
U.S. exporters to Brazil and Argentina, even though transport costs 
 
 112.  Bill Vlasic, Ford Chooses China, Not Mexico, to Build its New Focus, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/business/ford-focus-china-
production.html?_r=0. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Dziczek et al., supra note 95, at 2. 
 115.  U.S-Canada Trade Facts, supra note 15. 
 116.  See RENEE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45018, POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF A U.S. 
NAFTA WITHDRAWAL: AGRICULTURAL MARKETS (2017). 
 117.  U.S-Mexico Trade Facts, supra note 15.  
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would be higher because of the greater distances from those export 
markets to Mexico. In the short term, Mexican consumers could be 
harmed through higher food prices, partly as a result of peso 
devaluation but also through increases in animal feed costs, injury that 
the government is likely to try to avoid until new agricultural supply 
chains can be established over several years.  
Under NAFTA, with zero tariffs on most agricultural products 
exported to Mexico, 
U.S. exports of farm products to Mexico have a huge tariff 
advantage. Under WTO rules, which apply currently to Argentina and 
Brazil among other competing source countries, but would apply to 
U.S. exports post-NAFTA, wheat is subject to a 15 percent tariff, beef, 
25 percent, and chicken, 75 percent.118 
Mexico exports labor-intensive farm produce to the United States, 
e.g., tomatoes, avocados, peppers, grapes, cucumbers, melons, berries, 
onions, other fruits/vegetables avocados, cantaloupes and tomatoes, 
accounting for 44 percent of total U.S. imports.119  Most such fruits and 
vegetables currently enter duty-free; MFN tariffs are high in some 
product lines, e.g., 12.8%-29.8% for cantaloupes depending on the 
season, but much less for tomatoes (2.8-3.9 cents/kg) and in between 
for avocados (11.2 cents/kg).120  Such tariffs would presumably be 
passed on to consumers and thus impact supermarket prices soon, or 
consumers would simply have fewer choices particularly in the off-
season, but may be offset in part by a declining Peso against the dollar. 
Sufficient alternative sources probably do not exist in the United 
States, particularly in the winter, due to a (worsening) shortage of legal 
farm workers and water shortages in Arizona and California among 
other factors. With tomatoes, as noted earlier, the industry is seeking 
and the U.S. government demanding from Mexico, more extensive so-
called unfair trade action protection for the Florida growers, who 
complain about the longer growing season, lack of humidity and lower 
cost labor in Mexico as an “unfair” advantage!121 
Existing U.S. concerns over access to the Canadian agricultural 
market under NAFTA include the supply management system that 
Canada uses to regulate dairy, turkey, chicken and egg industries, as 
 
 118.  Swanson & Granville, supra note 82. 
 119.  RENEE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34468, THE U.S. TRADE SITUATION FOR 
FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PRODUCTS (2016).  
 120.  See Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, USITC Pub. 4750 (2018) 
(citing 0702 tomatoes); 0804.40 (avocados); 0807.19 (cantaloupes). 
 121.  Dewey, supra note 30. 
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listed in the U.S. demands reiterated in November;122 geographical 
indications in CETA that could potentially limit imports of certain U.S. 
wine and cheese; and on U.S. grain imports.123  If both NAFTA and 
CFTA were to disappear, U.S. exports to Canada would undoubtedly 
become more expensive and less competitive, particularly with the 
advent of CETA in September 2017.  Historically, the bulk of 
Canada’s imports of agricultural products from the United States have 
been prepared foods and specialty products, including wine, chocolate 
and beverages. However, as of 2010 the import volume was relatively 
small, approximately CDN$27.2 billion worth from all sources.124 
Should NAFTA disappear, it is possible that some of the current U.S. 
exports could be eventually be displaced by EU exports under CETA, 
particularly if the Canadian dollar continues to depreciate against the 
U.S. dollar, making Canadian imports from the United States relatively 
more expensive. 
V. COMPLEXITIES OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM NAFTA 
NAFTA provides that “A Party may withdraw from this 
Agreement six months after it provides written notice of withdrawal to 
the other Parties.  If a Party withdraws, the Agreement shall remain in 
force for the other Parties.”125 There is little doubt that as a matter of 
international law such notice would be considered effective for the 
United States once all requirements under U.S. law are met.126 
However, as with most international agreements, NAFTA does not 
address the domestic legal and constitutional procedures that may be 
required for the United States to withdraw from NAFTA as a matter of 
domestic law. 
This is complex and uncertain legal area, since the Constitution 
and most relevant legislation do not address withdrawal.  In a few 
instances, a president has terminated an Article I-II treaty without 
seeking Congressional or Senate approval.  For example, in 1979, 
President Jimmy Carter terminated the U.S. defense treaty with 
 
 122.  Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation, supra note 28, at 3. 
 123.  Canada—Import Tariffs, EXPORT.GOV (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://www.export.gov/article?id=Canada-Import-Tariffs. 
 124.  Agricultural and Trade Policy Background Note: Canada, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
ORG. 3 (Table 4), 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/est/meetings/wto_comm/Trade_policy_brief_Canad
a_final.pdf. 
 125.  NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 2205. 
 126.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 70, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
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Taiwan as a precondition to establishing formal diplomatic relations 
with the People’s Republic of China. At the time the Senate approved 
a “sense of the Senate” resolution contending that prior consultation 
was required, but no final vote occurred.127 The litigation that followed 
was inconclusive, with the Supreme Court (absent a majority on a 
common ground) vacating a court of appeals opinion holding that 
presidential authority alone was sufficient and ordering that the lawsuit 
be dismissed.128 No similar precedent exists for withdrawal by the 
President from an FTA approved under Trade Promotion 
Authority/Fast-track provisions.129 
Presidents have typically relied extensively on their Article II 
powers in foreign relations, as broadly supported by United States v. 
Curtiss Wright,130 decided at a time (1936) when presidential powers 
were probably at their all-time zenith. As recently as 2017, a 
Congressional Research Service analysis reaches the somewhat 
ambiguous conclusion that: 
[T]he weight of judicial and scholarly opinion suggests that the 
President possesses the exclusive constitutional authority to 
communicate with foreign powers, and such authority might provide 
the President with a constitutional basis for withdrawing from at least 
some types of international agreements. The agreement’s subject 
matter, however, might be relevant to a legal analysis . . . Even in the 
event that the President could properly withdraw from an FTA 
unilaterally, the President cannot make laws, and thus repeal of federal 
statutory provisions implementing U.S. FTA obligations requires 
congressional action. Congress has enacted provisions that appear to 
delegate to the President authority to repeal some provisions of federal 
statutory law implementing FTA obligations upon termination of, or 
U.S. withdrawal from, the agreement. However, the President might 
not be able to exercise this authority if a court struck down such 
provisions as unconstitutional or Congress amended or repealed 
 
 127.  See CRS Annotated Constitution: Interpretation and Termination of Treaties as 
International Compacts, CORNELL U. LEGAL INFO. INSTITUTE, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/anncon/html/art2frag19_user.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) 
(discussing the Taiwan treaty termination process).  
 128.  Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 
(1979). As the Cornell note observed, “Four Justices found the case nonjusticiable because of 
the political question doctrine, id., 1002, but one other Justice in the majority and one in dissent 
rejected this analysis. Id., 998 (Justice Powell), 1006 (Justice Brennan). The remaining three 
Justices were silent on the doctrine.” 
 129.  BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44630, U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED LEGAL QUESTIONS (2017). 
 130.  299 U.S. 204 (1936). 
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them.131  
Much of the complexity arises from the Constitutional separation 
of powers, particularly in cases involving trade and commerce. The 
executive powers of the President under Article II have been 
interpreted as providing the President with a “vast share of 
responsibility” for the conduct of foreign relations132, including the 
treaty power and acting as commander in chief. Simultaneously, 
Article I, section 8 provides Congress with the authority to “lay and 
collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises,” (2) “regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, among the several states and with the Indian 
Tribes,” and (3) “make all laws which shall be necessary and proper” 
to carry out these specific powers. It is difficult to argue that the 
termination of a free trade agreement does not fall within both 1) and 
2) above. 
The NAFTA Implementation Act of 1993, in contrast to several 
later FTA implementing laws, does not incorporate “clear language on 
repeal of provisions implementing the agreement.  However, it does 
contain language that could potentially be construed as repealing some 
provisions . . . at the time the United States determines not to apply the 
agreement with respect to a NAFTA partner country as a result of U.S. 
withdrawal from the agreement.”133  The lack of explicit language 
notwithstanding, any effort by the Trump Administration to withdraw 
from NAFTA and increase tariffs to MFN (or higher) levels would 
likely generate a firestorm among some members of the Congress and 
Senate as well as thousands of affected stakeholders, and almost 
certainly spawn multiple lawsuits (although whether they would reach 
the merits and if so result in a meaningful remedy for the plaintiffs is 
uncertain).  
In addition to other factors that might affect a presidential 
decision to withdraw unilaterally from NAFTA, it is notable that the 
renegotiation of NAFTA has been proceeding in compliance by the 
Trump Administration with the 2015 Trade Promotion Authority 
 
 131.  MURRILL, supra note 129, at ii. 
 132.  Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003). 
 133.  MURRILL, supra note 129, at 13, noting further “NAFTA Implementation Act §109(b) 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. Chapter 21) (“During any period in which a country ceases to be a 
NAFTA country, sections 101 through 106 shall cease to have effect with respect to such 
country.”); id. §415 (“Except as provided in subsection (b), on the date on which a country 
ceases to be a NAFTA country, the provisions of this title (other than this section) and the 
amendments made by this title, [which pertain to dispute settlement in antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases,] shall cease to have effect with respect to that country.”). 
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legislation.134 Thus, to comply with one of the significant statutory 
requirements, The U.S. Trade Representative provided Congress with 
a “Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation” in July 2017 
as required by TPA,135 and an updated summary in November.136  There 
is no indication that the Administration, at least at the present time, 
contemplates any deviation from the TPA rules.  Moreover, while the 
current three-year TPA expires July 1, 2018, it  is subject to an 
automatic three-year extension if requested by the President by April 
1, assuming that neither House of Congress vetoes the extension by 
majority vote.   It would be foolhardy for the Administration to 
terminate NAFTA at a time when the Administration would need an 
extension of TPA to negotiate any future trade agreements. 
All this suggests, at minimum, that the Administration might well 
consider seriously the adverse consequences of acting against the will 
of many of his own party in Congress (to the extent that such “will” 
can be determined) in a bedrock area (the Commerce Clause) before 
seeking to terminate NAFTA unilaterally in the event the negotiations 
become extended, or appear to be failing. Among other factors, Texas 
Senator John Cornyn has reminded the Administration of Congress’ 
role in approving a new NAFTA, and urged that the Administration to 
keep out “some of these more controversial provisions.”137 
Should the President decide nevertheless to move forward with 
termination, either because of frustration with the pace of the 
negotiations or as a negotiating ploy (which could trigger a walkout by 
Mexico and Canada from the negotiations138), from an economic and 
political point of view the results could be adverse. Assuming that 
litigation resolving the question of the President’s authority (and the 
many questions of what tariffs and other NAFTA provisions if any 
 
 134.  Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. 
No. 114-26, 129 Stat. 343 (2015). 
 135.  Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (July 17, 2017), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf (citing Section 
105(a)(1)(D) of the Act) (“Objectives I”)).  
 136.  Id. 
 137.  See Cornyn Warns Administration Not to Take Congress for Granted on NAFTA, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Nov. 21, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/cornyn-warns-
administration-not-take-congress-granted-nafta (reflecting warnings communicated to USTR 
Robert Lighthizer). 
 138.  See Patrick J. McConnell, Mexico Signals Tougher Stance on NAFTA, May Pull Out 
of Talks if Trump Moves to Scrap Deal, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017, 11:30 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-nafta-20170831-story.html 
(quoting Mexican Foreign Secretary Luis Videgaray as stating that Mexico would not remain 
in the negotiations if Trump begins the withdrawal process). 
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would continue to apply and for how long) would take a year or more 
to resolve, the level of confusion among stakeholders would be 
extreme, including but not limited to concerns about the level of tariffs 
the United States might seek to impose (WTO legal or otherwise) on 
imports from Canada and Mexico, and uncertainties as to how and 
when Canada and Mexico would retaliate. Still, under the provisions 
of other legislation existing (zero) tariff rates would apparently be 
continued for a year unless the President decided to promulgate pre-
NAFTA GATT/WTO rates prior to that time.139   
VI. THE (GENERALLY UNATTRACTIVE) OPTIONS 
It is difficult at this juncture (April 2018) to envision any broadly 
satisfactory outcome to the NAFTA renegotiations if the United States 
continues to insist on a list of demands many of which are effectively 
non-negotiable for Canada and/or Mexico, as discussed earlier. While 
Mexico and Canada may be willing to make some concessions to save 
NAFTA, it is obvious that a renegotiated NAFTA must be 
economically and politically acceptable to all sides, an enormous 
challenge if the United States continues to demand above all that a 
radically altered NAFTA must reduce the U.S. trade deficit.140 Under 
that circumstance, the negotiations are bound to fail eventually, 
whether before or after the Mexican and U.S. elections in 2018.  
All NAFTA Parties have already recognized that the initial 
deadlines for completing the negotiations (December 31, 2017 and 
March 31, 2018) were unrealistic for a negotiation of this complexity. 
The most likely option, given that none of the Parties at present appears 
to be enthusiastic about referring to its Congress or voters an 
agreement that would be attacked at home, suggests that even 
President Trump would be willing to continue the negotiations into the 
fall (or beyond), explaining to his supporters that he is still fighting for 
a better NAFTA.141  That at least would give the negotiators a 
reasonable time to attempt compromise on the most difficult issues in 
 
 139.  M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & IAN F. FERGUSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42965, THE 
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) (2017) (citing Sec. 125 of the Trade 
Act of 1974, P.L. 93-618, 19 U.S.C. 2135 (2016)). 
 140.  See John Paul Rathbone & Shawn Donnan, Mexico Insists Reform of NAFTA Trade 
Deal Must Suit All Sides, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/52170860-b409-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399 (discussing the views 
of Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Videgaray). 
 141.  See Shawn Donnan, Political Concerns Push Back NAFTA Talks Deadline, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 28, 2018), available at https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-
watch/extending-trade-promotion-authority (last visited Feb. 5, 2018) (discussing the reasons 
the negotiations are likely to stretch into the fall or beyond). 
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a less toxic political climate in both the United States and Mexico.  The 
need for more time was evident in early May 2018, when despite 
several weeks of intense, high level negotiations, no agreement even 
in principle was reached by the latest target date of May 1, suggesting 
that the U.S. Administration’s hope of obtaining approval of a new 
NAFTA by the end of the current Congress a highly unrealistic one.142  
Significant changes on many issues of importance to the United 
States, such as better market access to the Canadian dairy market, 
major modification of NAFTA Chapter 19, elimination or major 
modification of ISDS and state-to-state dispute settlement as well as  
obligations regarding cross-border trucking, plus an increase in the 
North American (but not the U.S.) content for autos trade in the region 
are probably achievable. So are most of the TPP upgrades (data 
protection rules, labor, environment, ecommerce, SOEs and the like.  
Many of this latter group have already been accepted by the three 
Parties in TPP as noted earlier and are thus relatively uncontroversial.  
Finally, even if the Trump Administration, Canada and Mexico 
were to agree on a revised text, there is no assurance that it would be 
accepted by a majority of the House and of the Senate, as Senator 
Cornyn and others have suggested.  Many in both houses, mostly 
Democrats with strong labor union constituencies, have opposed 
NAFTA since before it was approved by Congress in 1993 and will 
continue do so in the future.  Recently, Public Citizen, which has long 
opposed the TPP’s extended protection for intellectual property (and 
has opposed NAFTA for twenty-five years), rejoiced when the TPP-
11 eliminated many of those U.S. sponsored changes.143 But a 
renegotiated NAFTA, with more limited expansion of IP beyond WTO 
rules, the curtailing of ISDS, and better labor and environmental 
protection, might win over at least a few of the Members of Congress 
and the Senate who have opposed NAFTA to date. 
Conversely, many business interests will be unhappy if the 
investor protection provisions are eliminated, or stronger rules of 
origin increase the costs of auto manufacturing in North America. 
Also, advocates of strong labor rights and environment protection may 
be reluctant to support labor and environment provisions negotiated by 
 
   142 See Josh Wingrove & Eric Martin, NAFTA Nations Won’t Wrap Up Talks before U.S. 
Trip to China (1), Int’l Trade Daily (BNA), Apr. 30, 2018 (outlining the time constraints that 
are complicating the negotiations). 
 143.  Anshu Siripurapu, Analysts: TPP-11 Deal Could Impact NAFTA Negotiations, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Nov. 16, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/analysts-tpp-11-deal-
could-impact-nafta-negotiations (quoting former USTR official Wendy Cutler and a 
Brookings Institution report). 
GANTZ - RISKS AND REWARDS OF RENEGOTIATING NAFTA (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2018  1:51 PM 
2018] THE NORTH AMERICAN TRADE RELATIONSHIP 161 
an Administration that lacks credibility in these areas and has both 
repudiated the Paris Accord on Climate Change and made a practice 
of seeking to roll back Obama era environmental protections.144  
Overall, a radical revision of NAFTA, according to congressional 
sources, will not as the USTR suggests result in both business and labor 
support. Rather, it is just as likely to lead to many members of both 
American political parties opposing the arrangements.145  These often-
conflicting forces make accurate prediction of Congressional reaction 
very difficult. 
Moreover, this suggests that Members of the Congress and Senate 
in the United States, officials of state and local governments, consumer 
groups and private business stakeholders in all three NAFTA countries 
should be energetic and creative, despite the considerable costs, in 
devising contingency plans for continuing to operate (or ceasing to do 
business) in a post-NAFTA North America.  Given the complexities 
for the United States both in formally withdrawing from NAFTA (six 
months’ notice) and in eliminating the NAFTA zero tariffs that are 
embedded in the NAFTA Implementation Act of 1993 (probably a year 
or more), a one to two-year period likely exists for contingency 
planning. Such plans may well require implementation in all or part 
because most businesses, workers, consumers and state and local 
governments in the three countries will be affected, some profoundly, 
by the demise or emasculation of NAFTA. Common sense suggests 
that it is in the interest of all those directly concerned to mitigate the 
ill effects to the extent possible, even though as usual workers may 
have little influence on the ultimate outcomes. 
 
 144.  See, e.g., Nadja Popovich, Livia Albeck-Ripka & Kendra Pierre-Louis, 52 
Environmental Rules on the Way Out Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/climate/trump-environment-rules-
reversed.html; Justin Worland, Trump Announces Withdrawal from Paris Agreement, TIME 
(June 1, 2017, 3:38 PM), http://time.com/4801134/paris-agreement-withdrawal-donald-
trump-rose-garden/. 
 145.  Lighthizer:’Historic’ NAFTA 2.0 Could Win Labor and Business Support, Lead to 
‘Paradigm Change’ in Congress, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/lighthizer-%E2%80%98historic%E2%80%99-nafta-20-
could-win-labor-and-business-support-lead-%E2%80%98paradigm-change. 
